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InTroduCTIon
Performance-based financing (PBF) is a 
type of provider payment mechanism where 
a financial incentive is given to healthcare 
workers that is linked to performance.1 Also 
known as pay-for-performance (P4P), its use in 
low-income and middle-income countries has 
grown since 2005 when Rwanda adopted it as 
national policy.1 Well-designed PBF schemes 
can be accompanied by broader reforms, 
which aim to clarify roles and responsibili-
ties, strengthen accountability and address 
certain structural problems facing health 
systems.1 However, a recent paper by Paul et al 
has raised concerns over the potential system-
wide and long-term effects of PBF, which may 
be damaging to health services in low-income 
and middle-income countries.2 This has led 
to a public debate on the evidence both for 
and against PBF in different settings,3 4 and 
the authors would like to contribute to this by 
sharing an experience from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).
THe drC ConTexT
Although the DRC has been post-conflict since 
2003, its health system remains weak; hospitals 
and clinics lack personnel and equipment, 
and often run out of critical medicine and 
supplies. Few public sector health workers 
receive any government payments; this is due 
to the payroll being out of date and plagued 
by ‘ghost workers’, which are people listed on 
the payroll to receive a salary but who do not 
currently practice in health facilities.5 There-
fore, in an effort to maintain health service 
delivery, donors have been implementing 
PBF schemes across the country for several 
years. Many of these have been delivered as 
stand-alone PBF programmes; for example, 
a previous health programme called Access 
to Healthcare (ATH) funded by the Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID) 
between 2008 and 2013 channelled payments 
to workers outside of the national system. 
By 2015, a quarter of all health zones were 
receiving PBF support from various different 
donors.6 Its roll-out has been endorsed by the 
Ministry of Health, but there is no national 
PBF scheme for the country as yet.
However, in the DRC, the evidence 
suggests that health workers do not value PBF 
payments as much as they do fixed salaries.7 8 
Effects of PBF on performance have also been 
mixed in this context. In one study, PBF led 
to efficiency gains and improvements in 
service quality9; another study demonstrated 
Summary box
 ► Performance-based financing (PBF) has been exten-
sively employed by donors in low-income and mid-
dle-income countries as a strategy to improve health 
service delivery.
 ► In the Democratic Republic of Congo, PBF is being 
implemented by donors and is endorsed by the 
Ministry of Health in a context where only a minority 
of health workers receive a government salary.
 ► A donor-funded health systems strengthening pro-
gramme, which did not employ PBF, has recently 
succeeded in facilitating the payment of health 
workers by government.
 ► The programme achieved this by working closely 
with the government to conduct a census of health 
workers in order to update the payroll, which would 
in turn increase the number of salaried health 
workers.
 ► Key lessons learnt from this experience included the 
importance of understanding the existing financial 
architecture of health workers and its underlying 
constraints, and focusing on sustainable, nation-
al solutions rather than stand-alone donor-driven 
quick fix solutions, which may be more challenging 
to maintain over the longer term.
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that PBF did elicit an increase in efforts to target service 
provision, but did not stimulate demand for services, and 
even resulted in a reduction of intrinsic motivation of 
workers.10
An AlTernATIve To PBF
In 2013, a new health systems strengthening programme 
funded by DFID called Accès Aux Soins de Santé Primaire 
(Access to Primary Healthcare/ASSP) commenced. In 
contrast to other donor programmes that were contin-
uing with PBF or introducing follow-on PBF schemes, 
ASSP started to phase PBF out from its predecessor 
programme ATH. It was hypothesised that the presence 
of PBF—among other reasons including a low national 
budget for health, poor governance and security issues—
had reduced incentives for the government to salary its 
health workers, thus potentially undermining system-
wide reform in the sector. Instead, the ASSP programme 
worked closely with the government to conduct a census 
of health workers in order to update the payroll, which 
would in turn increase the number of salaried health 
workers.5
In practice, the phasing out of PBF proved difficult: it 
was perceived to have caused an exodus of workers from 
facilities as well as to have negatively affected their motiva-
tion and relationships with the local community.11 Part of 
the reason was that the change was poorly communicated, 
and performance payments were much higher than other 
sources of revenue received by workers including salaries, 
and so their removal constituted a significant economic 
shock to workers.8 11 Nonetheless, those workers who 
remained in facilities post-withdrawal of PBF indicated 
they would prefer to receive a fixed salary payment from 
the government compared with a performance payment 
from donors, as they saw the former as a more sustainable 
source of income.8
ASSP eventually succeeded in updating the health 
worker payroll for the provinces of Kasai and Kasai 
Central, as described by Likofata et al.5 Ghost worker 
payments were redistributed to thousands of previously 
undercompensated or uncompensated health workers 
in the civil service. However, the solution was not solely 
technical. The payment of health workers was outside 
the control of the Ministry of health, and under the 
purview of the Ministries of Finance, Budget and Public 
Sector Reform. Development partners involved in imple-
menting ASSP therefore had to build relationships and 
work across these different Ministries, in order to secure 
government ownership and influence change. This was 
particularly crucial as there would have been vested inter-
ests within Ministries to maintain the status quo as sala-
ries tend to be intricately tied to patronage and issues 
of political expediency.12 The DRC’s Health Develop-
ment Plan 2016–2020 also now acknowledges there is a 
continued need to strengthen information systems on 
human resources for health and improve on the number 
of salaried workers.13
leSSonS leArnT
Several key lessons were learnt from this experience. 
First, PBF can serve as a distraction from the pursuit 
of more challenging interventions that are needed to 
address the underlying constraints of health systems. In 
the DRC, the financial compensation received by workers 
under donor-funded PBF schemes was effectively serving 
as a partial substitute for salaries, as only a minority of 
workers were being paid by the government; a similar 
analogy would be that of applying a plaster to an infected 
wound, rather than treating the underlying infection. 
The attraction of PBF for donors is understandable as it 
allows them to measure and demonstrate to their own 
governments and tax payers the results and value for 
money of their investments. On the other hand, inter-
ventions that require donors normally focused on health 
to work across several Ministries may seem less appealing.
Yet, a failure to address the problems at root can lead 
to a perpetuation of weak government leadership and 
accountability.14 In fragile and conflict-affected states 
such as the DRC, despite close coordination with govern-
ment, PBF schemes are often still too complex for states 
to manage within their existing systems, and so involve 
the introduction of parallel systems to channel funding 
to providers and verify performance. Due to poor gover-
nance and accountability in the DRC, partners do not 
provide budget support; instead, PBF funds go directly 
into the accounts of health facilities. This results in PBF 
undermining rather than reinforcing state capacity.15 
Furthermore, given that donor funding for perfor-
mance-based incentives will in all likelihood eventually 
be withdrawn, there is the risk of creating a dependency 
on an income source that is not sustainable over the long 
term, with all the negative consequences that can entail.
Another lesson learnt was the need to understand 
the financial environment within which health workers 
operate when considering PBF initiatives.16 It has been 
acknowledged that PBF initiatives are often implemented 
as stand-alone projects without due consideration being 
given to the overall health system environment and 
their integration therein.17 Although the PBF model 
employed by the ATH programme did show evidence of 
improvements in performance over the short term,10 it 
could not have been sustainably financed in the absence 
of external aid. Soucat et al have highlighted the impor-
tance of understanding how PBF could be blended with 
the existing base payment mechanism to effectively align 
provider incentives with health policy objectives.17 This 
is key to ensuring that the system is structurally and 
financially sustainable; rather than adding extra income 
through a parallel system, existing income payments 
may be adjusted to make a proportion of it perfor-
mance based. More recent innovations, like the Global 
Financing Facility which has started in the DRC, may 
also provide a good mechanism to support government 
efforts to enhance domestic resource mobilisation.18 
The authors would argue, however, that the payment of 
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salaries to workers should first be ensured before intro-
ducing more complex remuneration structures.
ConCluSIon
Donor-funded work to support the financing of health 
systems and its health workers should as far as possible 
address local priorities, be integrated into existing 
systems and seek to address root cause challenges, rather 
than focus on quick fix solutions such as stand-alone PBF 
schemes, which may be harder to sustain over time and 
could also lead to unintended consequences. This may 
require a commitment to working across Ministries and 
a willingness to prioritise sustainable national solutions 
over donor needs to quickly demonstrate results of aid.
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